Chiny,English

K. Żelichowska: Whose backyard is it now? – Europe and China’s rise in Africa

“Debating over Asia and Europe in the Brussels’ rain”

Africa has traditionally been considered as Europe’s ‘backyard’ or ‘pre’-carre.’ Long colonial past has left the founding Member States of the European Community (EC) with the evident legacy for further relationship. Already the Treaty of Rome in 1957 attributed to the African colonies an association status, thereby favoring the EU’s structured involvement in the African continent.[1] Europe is by far the most important partner for Africa, however there are new players coming along to the backyard wishing to establish profitable alliances. Rules of the game are also changing by the global circumstances, for instance with the recent financial crisis decreasing the overall flow of Western investments and aid to Africa, leaving free space for ‘new’ actors.

The unprecedented impact was made by the appearance of China in Africa, first of all in terms of economic growth and infrastructure building in just a few years;[2] and secondly in the global reaction to that process. Many scholars, politicians and journalists perceive it as a danger neo-colonial behavior,[3] for instance in June 2011, the US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton gave a speech in Zambia warning of a new colonialism threatening the African continent, “which is easy to come in, take out natural resources, pay off leaders and leave.” Although Clinton didn’t  name ‘China’ specifically in her remarks, the suggestion was clear enough.[4]

Hence, the question remains open: what does the China’s rise in Africa mean? Is it good or bad for Africa?

The International Spectator stated: “China is often described as a ‘ruthless’ power as opposed to the ‘civilian power’ of the EU. While China is commonly described as a Realpolitik global player, the EU is generally portrayed as a benevolent actor concerned with human rights and peace on the African continent.”[5] Critics say Chinese strategy is entirely self-promotional, aimed at maintaining access to Africa’s precious mineral resources even when that means propping up odious governments. China’s supporters emphasis strictly neutral and business-oriented approach, preferring to generate economic growth and not dependency on foreign aid.[6] Chinese leaders justify the cooperation with shared historical heritage of a joint struggle with Africa against Western imperialism. Indeed, China and Africa have been united in the context of the Third World Movement during the Cold War; and China has actively supported African national independence movements against Europe.[7]

Meanwhile, bilateral trade between Africa and China continued to grow at an extraordinary pace, reaching $160 billion in 2011 from just $9 billion in 2000 and Chinese foreign direct investments went from under $100 million in 2003 to more than $12 billion in 2011. Additionally, vast infrastructure network which has for a long time been regarded as the key obstacle to the growth, has been built all over the continent with roads, railways, ports, airports, and more.[8] McKinsey Global Institute has highlighted that “since 2005, China’s total infrastructure commitments in sub-Saharan Africa have exceeded the World Bank’s infrastructures commitments.”[9] The UK Department for International Development (DFID) acknowledged that the Sino-African trade, China’s investment and aid played an active role in Africa’s development, which facilitated the fulfillment of the Millennium Development Goal in Africa.[10]

In September 2010, China has overtaken Japan as the world’s second largest economy, even though its per capita income is still very low as compared to that of United States and Japan. Earlier, in 2009, the US was overtaken by China as Africa’s major trading partner, however both these countries remain far behind the level of trade volumes with the EU total (see: charts). Looking from broader perspective, Western – in this context namely the OECD countries – remain key trading partners for Africa and trade volume between them have kept growing, though less rapidly than with other emerging partners (non-OECD members), with China, India, and Brazil leading the pack.[11] Worth mentioning is a challenge already facing by China from other emerging markets. E.g. for the past two years, Africa’s exports to China as a percentage of total global trade have remained steady, revealing a new class of trade partners from Brazil to Turkey competing for access. India’s trade with Africa grew to $57 billion in 2011, while even South Korea is now at $22.2 billion.[12]

Chart no.1 Partner countries and regions of African merchandise trade as a percentage of total African merchandise trade. Source: OECD Factbook 2011-2012 Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics.

Chart no.2 Africa’s Total Trade with the rest of the World 2000-2011.

Source: OECD Development Centre, http://www.oecd.org/dev/europemiddleeastandafrica/

Chart no.3 China-Africa trade (in USD bn). Source: The Beijing Axis, http://www.oecd.org/dev/europemiddleeastandafrica/

 

Hence, taking into consideration available empirical data, Chinese influence in Africa is often much exaggerated among the public opinion. E.g. Sino-African energy cooperation lags far behind of that between the EU and the US with Africa. 79% of the African oil output is for export, among which 36% is exported to Europe, 33% to the US and only 8.7% to China.[13]

China’s motives for investing in Africa are quite clear, starting only with the arable land, oil and minerals. Actually, more than 80% of Sino-African trade is based around natural resources (like oil, ores, and minerals). In order to maintain political stability, satisfy the citizens’ needs and prevent a crisis of legitimacy for their rule, the government in Beijing has to keep economic growth rates high and continue to bring hundreds of millions of people out of poverty.[14] In the pursuit of finding solutions to the problems such as overpopulation (despite one child policy), growing unemployment and the demand of natural resources, China has set its sight on Africa.[15] However, not everything is centrally-planed by the CCP. Jing Gu, political economist, wrote an interesting article about the expansion of Chinese small private enterprises in Africa, quite independently of the government. Pushed by intense competition within domestic marketplace they are heading to Africa – ‘the Last Golden Land’ –  in search of new business opportunity.[16]

And as from the African perspective, China has first of all already succeeded in a remarkable manner, between 1978 and 2010, to uplift more than 600 million people out of poverty, which gave them enormous credential basis in its relations with Africa. Second, with approximately 60%  of the population under age 24, foreign investment and job creation are the only forces that can reduce poverty in Africa and bring economic growth into the region.[17] Third, when dealing international relations, Chinese government has a basic principle of ‘non-interference of internal affairs.’ Hence, China offers no classical strings-attached loans, in opposition to the EU and other Western countries, who require that the African nations meet certain conditions before loans are granted. China maintains that business is business and the government should not make its loans conditional.[18] This posture is actually a reaffirmation of the ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence,’ formulated already in 1954 and setting out the guidelines for Beijing’s foreign policy. These Five Principles are “mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, nonaggression, noninterference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.”[19] Western countries, in opposite, interfere in the internal affairs in the name of protecting human right and promoting democracy together with standard of good governance.

The noninterference issue has become a key point of debate between China and Western countries, though Africa elites generally enthusiastically support this norm and Chinese involvement in the region. Based on the survey conducted by Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong,[20] African views are not nearly as negative as Western media make out, nor as positive as official Chinese sources imply. Instead, their findings show opinions are variegated and complex, although with not only the African ruling elites being positive about those new cooperation links.

‘The battle for influence in the world between the West and China is not Africa’s problem. Our continent is in a hurry to build infrastructure, ensure affordable energy and educate our people. China’s approach to our needs is simply better adapted than the slow and sometimes patronizing post-colonial approach of European investors, donor organizations and non-governmental organizations’ said Abdoulaye Wade, while serving as a president of Senegal. President Yoweri Museveni, despite Uganda being one the darlings of the West, stated ‘The Western ruling groups are conceited, full of themselves, ignorant of our conditions, and they make other people’s business their business. Whereas the Chinese just deal with you, you represent your country, they represent their own interests, and you do business.’[21]

China began to find itself in a position of serving as a role model for other developing countries. The emphasis is being put on a pragmatic, flexible, and step-by-step approach, as opposed to an ideological, universal Washington consensus.[22]The so-called ‘Beijing Consensus’ represents another model of economic growth, however this term has never been officially used by the Chinese government. Joshua Ramo, a senior consultant of Goldman Sachs, used it for the first time in 2004 as a synonym of ‘commitment to innovation and constant experimentation (…).’ The concept has attracted attention worldwide and become an important topic concerning China’s rise and its soft power.[23] However, there is little empirical evidence to support that the collapse of the Washington Consensus and the rise of the Beijing Consensus has led Beijing to pursue multilateral options. The Beijing Consensus might have developed as a result, rather than a cause, of the evolution of the Chinese policies.[24]

China’s growing involvement in Africa had to caused Western responses. David Shinn, the former US ambassador to Burkina Faso and Ethiopia, mentioned that ‘deepening engagement of China in Africa was creating „deep nervousness” in the Western countries.’ In the perspective of maintaining its global hegemony, the US regards cooperation with China in Africa as an important measure to protect its interests and therefore has started to urge China to display responsibility in its international behavior to promote the democracy and good governance in Africa.[25] In case of the EU, scholars emphasize that Europe’s interest in Africa is rather a consequence of its ambitions to become a global actor again and the search for a coherent external policy.[26] In spite of those ambitions, by so far, the EU initiatives towards Africa, including even the concept of triple cooperation between the EU, Africa and China, have all failed for many reasons.[27]

In 2006, the EU released a policy paper entitled EU-China: Closer Partners, Growing Responsibilities, demanding China to urge the African countries to practice good governance and strengthen coordination with the EU, however with no further success. The new approach was followed by the EC Communication from 2008 –‘The EU, Africa and China: Towards trilateral dialogue and cooperation’ with the objective stated by the former EU Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, Louis Michel: ‘we are competitors, but we are also partners and Africa should benefit rather than suffer from our presence.’[28]  Nevertheless, the concept has failed for a time being as the EU thought again that Africa would accept anything what the EU had to offer.

On the contrary, the growing presence of China in Africa has given some extra leverage to a few African countries in their negotiations with the EU (and other Western countries), putting them in much stronger bargaining position.[29] It has already encouraged the EU to act as a more coherent and consistent international actor and to start redefining the nature of its partnership with Africa too. [30] At some point, Europe will have to dismiss the traditional, ‘patronizing’ attitude towards its ‘backyard’ and as a result, new opportunities will arise for future Sino-European cooperation in Africa.[31]

There is also a lot of work to do by the Africans themselves. Giving only the example of China, its presence in the region is not entirely positive and noncontroversial, rather the opposite. Environmental issues, clashes between local inhabitants and Chinese migrants, problems with the labour law and most of all, the impact of massive influx of cheap products affecting domestic production and markets[32]. The list of obstacles and difficulties could go on and on. Thus, in order to build a better future, “Africa will have to avoid trade dependence on China as a consumer of Africa’s raw materials, importer of cheap Chinese commodities to Africa, and provider of capital goods and foreign loans.”[33]

First, the African economies should become diversified as much as possible away from supplying natural resources only. Second, the African countries need to encourage investors into more labor intensive sectors. Africa’s population is growing faster than anywhere else in the world, and job creation is a top priority. Third, the African countries could negotiate better investments’’ terms, including quality control and better linkages with local economies. Fourth, the African governments could urge new partners to improve market access for African goods overseas. Fifth, Africa should keep working to make itself as attractive business environment as possible, as its population will one day represent the world’s largest consumer market.[34]

China’s rise in Africa is a part of a rapidly changing international reality that presents enormous opportunities and challenges for the region and also for the globe. However, only the future will tell us for whom that relationship was either good or bad. Despite the suspicion that Chinese strategy might turn into a new form of economic patronage, one can state with no doubt that China has brought a breath of air into the African context – regardless to the quality of Beijing air.[35]

Bibliography: 

  • F,Rampa, S,Bilal, E,Sidiropoulos, ‘Leveraging South–South cooperation for Africa’s development’, South African Journal of  International Affairs, 19:2 (2012) 247-269.
  • D.Brautigam, T,Xiaoyang, ‘Economic statecraft in China’s new Overseas special economic zones: soft power, business or resource security?’, International Affairs, 88: 4 (2012) 799–816.
  • M,Farooki, ‘The infrastructure and commodities interface in Africa: Time for cautious optimism?’ Journal of International Development, 24 (2012) 208–219.
  • I,Sohn, ‘After renaissance: China’s multilateral offensive in the developing world’, European Journal of International Relations, 18 (2011) 77–101.
  • A,Mold, ‘Will it all end in tears? Infrastructure spending and African development in historical perspective’, Journal of International Development, 24 (2012) 237–254.
  • A.K.Stahl, ‘The Impact of China’s Rise on the EU’s Geopolitical Reach and Interests in Africa’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 16 (2011) 427–446.
  • L,Fioramonti, P.Kimunguyi, ‘Public and Elite Views on Europe vs. China in Africa’, The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, 46:1(2011) 69-82.
  • M.Carbone, ‘The European Union and China’s rise in Africa: Competing visions, external coherence and trilateral cooperation’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 29:2 (2011) 203-221.
  • J.Gu, ‘The Last Golden Land? Chinese Private Companies Go to Africa’, Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex Brighton, Paper 365.
  • J.Holslag, ‘China and the coups: Coping with political instability in Africa’, African Affairs, 110/440, 367–386.
  • L.Jianbo, Z.Xiaomin, ‘Multilateral cooperation in Africa between China and Western countries: from differences to consensus’, Review of International Studies / Volume 37 / Issue 04 / October 2011, pp 1793 1813.
  • Ł.Fijałkowski, ’China’s ‘soft power’ in Africa?’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 29:2, (2011) 223-232.
  • T.Lumumba-Kasongo; ‘China-Africa Relations: A Neo-Imperialism or a Neo-Colonialism? A Reflection’, African and Asian Studies, 10 (2011) 234-266.
  • B.Sautman, Y.Hairong, ‘African Perspectives on China–Africa Links’, The China Quarterly, 199, (2009), pp. 728–759.
  • Pa´D. Carmody, ‘An Asian-Driven Economic Recovery in Africa? The Zambian Case’, World Development (2009) Vol. 37, No. 7, pp. 1197–1207.
  • Ch.Alden, Ch.R.Hughes, ‘Harmony and Discord in China’s Africa Strategy: Some Implications for Foreign Policy’, The China Quarterly, (2009) 199, pp. 563–584.
  • M.Esteban, ‘The Chinese Amigo: Implications for the Development of Equatorial Guinea’, The China Quarterly, (2009) 199, pp. 667–685.
  • Ch.Kwan Lee, ‘Raw Encounters: Chinese Managers, African Workers and the Politics of Casualization in Africa’s Chinese Enclaves’, The China Quarterly, (2009) 199, pp. 647–666.
  • I.Taylor, ‘A Case of Mistaken Identity: “China Inc.” and Its “Imperialism” in Sub-Saharan Africa’, Asian Politics & Policy – Volume 1, Number 4 – Pages 709–725.
  • H.Kissinger, ‘On China’, Allen Lane for Penguin Group, 2011.

 

Internet: (access 22-30.10.2012)

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/28/opinion/beijing-a-boon-for-africa.html?_r=0

  • OECD official website:

The OECD Factbook 2011-2012 Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics.

Also: http://www.oecd.org/dev/europemiddleeastandafrica/

  • CNN News website:

http://edition.cnn.com/2011/BUSINESS/09/08/america.losing.influence.africa/index.html ;

http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/10/29/is-china-good-or-bad-for-africa/

  • The Beijing Axis website:

http://www.thebeijingaxis.com/tca/editions/the-china-analyst-sep-2011/100

  • Corporate Foreign Policy website:

http://corporateforeignpolicy.com/africa/china-struggling-to-adapt-in-a-more-competitive-africa



[1] A.K.Stahl, ‘The Impact of China’s Rise on the EU’s Geopolitical Reach and Interests in Africa’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 16 (2011) 427–446.

[2] For more details, see, for instance: L,Fioramonti, P.Kimunguyi, ‘Public and Elite Views on Europe vs. China in Africa’, The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, 46:1(2011) 69-82.

[3] For more details, see, for instance: T.Lumumba-Kasongo; ‘China-Africa Relations: A Neo-Imperialism or a Neo-Colonialism? A Reflection’, African and Asian Studies, 10 (2011) 234-266.

Nation-states pursue their own interests through various types of engagements such as partnerships, diplomacy, and wars as extensions of their powers.

[4] The New York Times website:

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/28/opinion/beijing-a-boon-for-africa.html?_r=0

Additionally, see the article of economist Martin Jacques for BBC (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-19995218), who admitted that China is on course to becoming a superpower, but not in the way many expect, giving the example that China has never colonised any overseas territories. “China has always tended to stay ‘at home’ as the overwhelming preoccupation of its rulers down the ages has been how to maintain order and stability and thereby retain power. The country is huge, diverse – and extremely difficult to govern. It remains just as true today. Overseas empires were a European speciality, with Japan getting in on the act for a short while too. China’s relationship with them was based not on colonialism but what we now know as the tributary system. It neither ruled them nor occupied them. Rather, in return for access to the Chinese market and various forms of protection, the rulers of tribute states were required to give gifts – literally tribute – to the Emperor as a symbolic acknowledgement of China’s superiority.”

Also, see: H.Kissinger, ‘On China’, Allen Lane, Penguin Group, 2011; chapter 1-2, p.5-56.

[5] For more details – the overview of different opinions about China’s rise in Africa – see, for instance: L,Fioramonti, P.Kimunguyi, ‘Public and Elite Views on Europe vs. China in Africa’, The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, 46:1(2011) 69-82.

[7] A.K.Stahl, ‘The Impact of China’s Rise on the EU’s Geopolitical Reach and Interests in Africa’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 16 (2011) 427–446.

[8] For more details, see, for instance: CNN News website:

http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/10/29/is-china-good-or-bad-for-africa/

[9] L,Fioramonti, P.Kimunguyi, ‘Public and Elite Views on Europe vs. China in Africa’, The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, 46:1(2011) 69-82.

[10] L.Jianbo, Z.Xiaomin, ‘Multilateral cooperation in Africa between China and Western countries: from differences to consensus’, Review of International Studies / Volume 37 / Issue 04 / October 2011, pp 1793 1813.

For more details – the Sino-African Institutions; Chinese Policy Papers on Africa –  see, for instance: I,Sohn, ‘After renaissance: China’s multilateral offensive in the developing world’, European Journal of International Relations, 18 (2011) 77–101. The Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) is a flagship platform for China’s multilateral diplomacy toward the developing world. The new Beijing-led regional institutions can be characterized by action plan commit­ments, bi-multilateralism, opacity, and multilayered networks. As African observers note, ‘the FOCAC is thus not a Western-style donor talk-shop, but rather a robust dialogue system which produces concrete results and specific outcomes’ (…).

[11] OECD Factbook 2011-2012 Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics.

[13] L.Jianbo, Z.Xiaomin, ‘Multilateral cooperation in Africa between China and Western countries: from differences to consensus’, Review of International Studies / Volume 37 / Issue 04 / October 2011, pp 1793-1813.

[15] For more details, see, for instance: T.Lumumba-Kasongo; ‘China-Africa Relations: A Neo-Imperialism or a Neo-Colonialism? A Reflection’, African and Asian Studies, 10 (2011) 234-266.

[16] For more details, see the full article:  J.Gu, ‘The Last Golden Land? Chinese Private Companies Go to Africa’, Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex Brighton, Paper 365.

[18] T.Lumumba-Kasongo; ‘China-Africa Relations: A Neo-Imperialism or a Neo-Colonialism? A Reflection’, African and Asian Studies, 10 (2011) 234-266.

[19] For more details, see, for instance: I.Taylor, ‘A Case of Mistaken Identity: “China Inc.” and Its “Imperialism” in Sub-Saharan Africa’, Asian Politics & Policy – Volume 1, Number 4 – Pages 709–725.

[20] For more details, see the full article: B.Sautman, Y.Hairong, ‘African Perspectives on China–Africa Links’, The China Quarterly, 199, (2009), pp. 728–759.

[21] M.Carbone, ‘The European Union and China’s rise in Africa: Competing visions, external coherence and trilateral cooperation’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 29:2 (2011) 203-221.

[22] I,Sohn, ‘After renaissance: China’s multilateral offensive in the developing world’, European Journal of International Relations, 18 (2011) 77–101.

[23] For more details, see the full article : L.Jianbo, Z.Xiaomin, ‘Multilateral cooperation in Africa between China and Western countries: from differences to consensus’, Review of International Studies / Volume 37 / Issue 04 / October 2011, pp 1793-1813. “From the 1980s, the Western countries impelled African countries to carry out an ‘economic restructuring plan’, ‘political democratization’ and ‘good governance’, which designated the essential philosophy of the Washington Consensus based on neo-liberalism. It requires the developing countries to carry out liberalization and privatization of their economy with non-government control. Theoretically, the Washington Consensus is perfect; however, practically it incurred failures in some countries. The ‘Beijing Consensus’ represents another model of economic growth or even the path of social development. This term was first put forward in May 2004 by Joshua Cooper Ramo, a senior consultant of Goldman Sachs, to summarize the model of China’s economic and social development since the opening-up and reform in 1978. According to Ramo, ‘commitment to innovation and constant experimentation’ is essential to the success of the Beijing Consensus. The basic experience includes: advancing cautiously instead completely relying on Western experience; pushing forward reform gradually instead of adopting radical ‘shock remedy’; taking the advantage of market economy and at the same time maintaining and giving full play to the capability of macro-management and mobilization of the government; encouraging creation and innovation and meanwhile handling properly the relations between development, reform and stability. The ‘Beijing Consensus’ attracted close attention worldwide and become an important topic concerning China’s rise and its soft power. While the Chinese government has never officially used such terms as Beijing Consensus’ or ‘China Model’, instead, it prefers the term ‘Chinese experiences in development’(…)”.

Also, for more details – Chinese Soft Power – see, for instance: Ł.Fijałkowski, ’China’s ‘soft power’ in Africa?’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 29:2, (2011) 223-232.

[24] I,Sohn, ‘After renaissance: China’s multilateral offensive in the developing world’, European Journal of International Relations, 18 (2011) 77–101.

[25] L.Jianbo, Z.Xiaomin, ‘Multilateral cooperation in Africa between China and Western countries: from differences to consensus’, Review of International Studies / Volume 37 / Issue 04 / October 2011, pp 1793-1813.

[26] M.Carbone, ‘The European Union and China’s rise in Africa: Competing visions, external coherence and trilateral cooperation’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 29:2 (2011) 203-221.

[27] For more details, see the full article: Rise and fall of triple cooperation – M.Carbone, ‘The European Union and China’s rise in Africa: Competing visions, external coherence and trilateral cooperation’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 29:2 (2011) 203-221. “It can be concluded that there was a triple overestimation by the European Commission: that the EU would be able to act cohesively and to share similar objectives regarding its relations with both China and Africa; that China was a unitary actor (on the contrary its policy towards Africa sees the involvement of ministries, state enterprises and the private sector) and was willing to engage; and that, once again, Africa would be eager to accept what the EU had to offer. None of these scenarios proved to be the case (…).”

[28] L,Fioramonti, P.Kimunguyi, ‘Public and Elite Views on Europe vs. China in Africa’, The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, 46:1(2011) 69-82.

[29] M.Carbone, ‘The European Union and China’s rise in Africa: Competing visions, external coherence and trilateral cooperation’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 29:2 (2011) 203-221.

[30] A.K.Stahl, ‘The Impact of China’s Rise on the EU’s Geopolitical Reach and Interests in Africa’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 16 (2011) 427–446.

[31]L,Fioramonti, P.Kimunguyi, ‘Public and Elite Views on Europe vs. China in Africa’, The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, 46:1(2011) 69-82.

[32] For more details – case studiem – see, for instancse: about Zambia –  Pa´D. Carmody, ‘An Asian-Driven Economic Recovery in Africa? The Zambian Case’, World Development (2009) Vol. 37, No. 7, pp. 1197–1207; about Guinea – M.Esteban, ‘The Chinese Amigo: Implications for the Development of Equatorial Guinea’, The China Quarterly, (2009) 199, pp. 667–685; about general situation – Ch.Kwan Lee, ‘Raw Encounters: Chinese Managers, African Workers and the Politics of Casualization in Africa’s Chinese Enclaves’, The China Quarterly, (2009) 199, pp. 647–666.

[33] T.Lumumba-Kasongo; ‘China-Africa Relations: A Neo-Imperialism or a Neo-Colonialism? A Reflection’, African and Asian Studies, 10 (2011) 234-266.

For more details, see the full article: http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/10/29/is-china-good-or-bad-for-africa/ . Concerning the raw materials “’it’s notable that China is not yet one of the supporting countries for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), an initiative to promote transparency and accountability in the governance of natural resources.’ Natural resources’ trade may create impressive headline growth figures, but it does not necessarily translate into widespread job creation. Also, large oil and mineral reserves can distort the local currency, pushing up prices of other exports, such as agricultural products, and making them much harder to sell overseas. Without careful management, oil and mineral revenues have often fuelled corruption which has a severely negative impact on a country’s development. (…)”

[35]L,Fioramonti, P.Kimunguyi, ‘Public and Elite Views on Europe vs. China in Africa’, The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, 46:1(2011) 69-82.

 

Katarzyna Żelichowska – absolwentka stosunków międzynarodowych na Uniwersytecie Jagiellońskim, stypendystka University of Applied Sciences – Hochschule Bremen. W latach 2010/2011 stypendystka Chinese Government Scholarship (EU Window) w Pekinie. Interesuje się Bliskim i Dalekim Wschodem, a w szczególności Chinami. Obecnie odbywa staż w jednej z Instytucji Unii Europejskiej w Brukseli. Znajomość języków: angielski, chiński, niemiecki.

Udostępnij:
  •  
  •  
  •  
  •  
  •  
  •  
  •  
  •  
K. Żelichowska: Whose backyard is it now? – Europe and China’s rise in Africa Reviewed by on 10 listopada 2012 .

“Debating over Asia and Europe in the Brussels’ rain” Africa has traditionally been considered as Europe’s ‘backyard’ or ‘pre’-carre.’ Long colonial past has left the founding Member States of the European Community (EC) with the evident legacy for further relationship. Already the Treaty of Rome in 1957 attributed to the African colonies an association status,

Udostępnij:
  •  
  •  
  •  
  •  
  •  
  •  
  •  
  •  

Pozostaw odpowiedź